University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Propositions

California Ballot Propositions and Initiatives

1996

Punishment for Murder. Special Circumstances.
Drive-By Shootings.

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/ca_ballot_props
Recommended Citation
Punishment for Murder. Special Circumstances. Drive-By Shootings. California Proposition 196 (1996).
http://repository.uchastings.edu/ca_ballot_props/1117

This Proposition is brought to you for free and open access by the California Ballot Propositions and Initiatives at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Propositions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

,

....III

rI96

&

.,1111
.-...--

Punishment for Murder. Special Circumstances.
Drive-By Shootings. Legislative Initiative Amendment.
Official Title and Summary Prepared by the Attorney General
PUNISHMENT FOR MURDER. SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.
DRIVE-BY SHOOTINGS. LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE AMENDMENT.

• Adds the intentional murder of a person by discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle with the
intent to inflict death to the list of special circumstances for first-degree murder for which the
death penalty or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is authorized.
• Joined to Proposition 195 (Chapter 477, Statutes of 1995). If both measures pass, murder during
carjacking, murder resulting from a carjacking kidnap, and murder of juror in retaliation for, or
to prevent, performance of juror's duties, are also added to the list of special circumstances.

Summary of Legislative Analyst's
Estimate of Net State and Local Government Fiscal Impact:
• Adoption of this measure would result in unknown state costs, potentially ranging into several
millions of dollars annually in the long run.

Final Votes Cast by the Legislature on SB 9 (Proposition 196)
Assembly: Ayes 55
Noes 12
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Senate: Ayes 29
Noes 3
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Analysis by the Legislative Analyst
Background
First degree murder is generally defined in state law
as murder which is planned in advance, or which takes
place during certain other crimes, including robbery,
kidnapping, rape, or arson. It is generally punishable by
a sentence of 25-years-to-life imprisonment with the
possibility of release from prison on parole. However, a
conviction for first-degree murder results in a sentence of
death or life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole if the prosecutor charges and the court finds that
one or more "special circumstances" specified in state law
apply to the crime.
Currently, a murder resulting from a "drive-by
shooting"-shooting someone from a motor vehicle-is a
first-degree murder if the firearm was intentionally
discharged with the intent to kill another person. Such a
murder is punishable by a sentence of 25-years-to-life

imprisonment with the possibility of parole. Such a
murder is not a special circumstance warranting the
more severe penalty of death or life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole.

Proposal
This measure adds first-degree murder resulting from
a drive-by shooting to the list of special circumstances
punishable by the death penalty or life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole.
Fiscal Effect
This measure would increase state costs primarily as a
result of longer prison terms for offenders who receive a
life sentence without the possibility of parole. The
magnitude of these costs is unknown, potentially ranging
into several millions of dollars annual~y in the long run.

For the text of Proposition 196 see page 58
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Punishment for Murder. Special ·Circumstances.
Drive-By Shootings. Legislative Initiative Amendment.
Argument in Favor of Proposition 196

Murder by drive-by shooting has reached epidemic
levels in California.
An average of more than one young person under the
age of 18 was a victim of a drive-by shooting in Los
Angeles alone every week in 1991, according to a recent
study in the New England Journal of Medicine; 36 of
these youths died.
The study found that drive-by shootings are no longer
confined to the inner city, but have spread everywhere.
Because the shooting is done from a moving vehicle, too
often the victim is an unintended target-an innocent
child, a high school student with no gang affiliation, a
young mother who happens to live in a neighborhood
targeted by drive-by shooters, or a harmless passer-by.
It's got to stop.
.

Proposition 196 would put drive-by shooters on notice
that they can be subjected to the strongest penalty
California can impose: the death penalty.
Proposition 196 would allow the death penalty, or life
in prison without possibility of parole, for intentional,
cold-blooded, first-degree murder committed by the
discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle at a person
outside the vehicle.
Please help us free our society from the senseless
outrage of drive-by murder. Vote YES on Proposition ~96.
RUBEN S. AYALA
State Senator, 32nd District
GREGORY D. TOTTEN
Executive Director, California District
Attorneys Association

Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Proposition 196
Everywhere it has been used, the death penalty has
failed to reduce murders and other kinds of violence. In
fact, studies actually show violence decreases after
repeal of death penalties. If you want to stop drive-by
shootings, work to rebuild communities, and vote NO on
Proposition 196.
Any drive-by killing is deplorable and needs to be
punished. Today, if a "special circumstance" such as a
prior murder conviction is involved, the death penalty
applies, otherwise the penalty may be life in prison
without possibility of parole.
Proponents of Proposition 196 want to distinguish this
crime from less heinous murders simply by the location
of the defendant when the crime was committed. They
want a killer who shoots from a car to be eligible for the
death penalty, while the same killer who walks into a
restaurant and shoots a child is not.
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Applying the death penalty in this way would raise
grave constitutional questions. According to the United
States Supreme Court, there must be a meaningful basis
for distinguishing between those who receive the death
penalty and those who do not. The entire justification for
a death penalty rests on the idea that "special
circumstances" justify a special penalty. If this proposal
is enacted, it would merely underline the irrationality of
the entire death penalty.
As a voter, this is your chance to say NO to laws that
divert attention and law enforcement resources from the
really effective ways to reduce crime. VOTE NO ON
PROPOSITION 196.
MICHAEL HENNESSY
Sheriff, City and County of San Francisco
WILSON C. RILES, JR.
Executive Director, American Friends Service
Committee of Northern California

Arguments printed on this page are the opinions of the authors and have not been checked for accuracy by any official agency.
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Argument Against Proposition 196
Proposition 196:
-WASTES TAX DOLLARS, a cost largely borne by
cities and counties;
-FAILS to address actual causes of violence;
-IGNORES LAW ENFORCEMENT views on the
priorities for effective policing of cities and
communities;
,
-MAKES MISTAKES LIKELY in the administration
of justice.
This measure does not focus on the real steps needed to
reduce violence and crime.
It is clear that the existence of capital punishment in
California already COSTS TAXPAYERS MILLIONS of
dollars due to the more extensive police work and court
proceedings involved-much more than the cost of
sentences to life in prison without possibility of parole.
Expanding the death penalty would take even more
money away from education, recreation, and other
programs that actually do keep young people away from
gangs and criminal activity. These costs would largely be
borne by cities and counties which are already in
financial trouble.
There is no evidence to suggest that the threat of the
death penalty will stop the gang activity which often
leads to a drive-by shooting. Experts recognize that
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT FAILS TO REDUCE
VIOLENCE. In fact, a recent poll found that although
most police chiefs support the death penalty in concept,
they do not think expanding its use would reduce
violence in their jurisdictions.

When asked about steps which would have a big
impact on violence, law enforcement officers most often
recommend strengthening families, neighborhoods, and
churches; more swift and sure penalties for all crimes;
improving control over illegal drugs; allowing greater
latitude on rules of evidence; creating more jobs and
greater economic opportunities; and getting guns out of
circulation. ONLY 2% OF POLICE CHIEFS SUGGEST
INCREASED USE of the death penalty as a priority for
reducing violent crime.
Church leaders recognize that Proposition 196 is likely
to harm suspects at lower income levels. Worse than
that, it RISKS WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS of innocent
individuals caught in ambiguous circumstances who will
not be able to afford to resist a plea bargain. Plea
bargains and separate trials also mean that in cases
involving several defendants it is not unusual for the
most culpable person to be spared the death penalty that
is given to others. California voters should not make
justice more capricious than it already is.
This legislation fails to take affirmative steps to reduce
crime. Vote NO on Proposition 196.
SENATOR MILTON MARKS
Chair, Senate Committee on Criminal Procedure
ROBERT P. OWENS
Retired Chief of Police, Oxnard Police Department
RIGHT REVEREND JERRY A. LAMB
Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Northern California

Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 196
Don't be misled by empty rhetoric!
FACT: PROPOSITION 196 is strongly supported by
EVERY major law enforcement organization in
California.
PROPOSITION 196 is supported by prosecutors,
victims' organizations, and others concerned with the
rising tide of gang violence in our communities.
FACT: PROPOSITION 196 directly deals with one of
the major crimes of violence plaguing' California.
According to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department, there were 1,816 drive-by shootings in Los
Angeles County alone, in 1994. In 1993 drive-by shooters
claimed 97 lives in Los Angeles County.
FACT: DRIVE-BY MURDER is no longer just an inner
city problem.
Cowardly gang-related shootings are spreading like
wildfire to the suburbs and even rural California. Vicious
though they are, drive-by murders are usually perverse
thrill killings, not crimes of passion. All too often, the
victims are innocent bystanders. Perpetrators of these
senseless murders must face the most severe sanction
the law can impose: THE DEATH PENALTY.
P96

PROPOSITION 196 is supported by:
Attorney General's Office
California Correctional Peace Officers Association
California Police Chiefs' Association
California Peace Officers' Association
California State Sheriffs' Association
California Organization of Police and Sheriffs
California District Attorneys Association
Women Prosecutors of California
Doris Tate Crime Victims Bureau
Los Angeles District Attorney
MAKE THE PENALTY FIT THE CRIME. Join these
and other organizations and individuals who are sick and
tired of gang-members preying on our communities.
VOTE YES ON PROPOSITION 196.
PETE WILSON
Governor
RUBEN S. AYALA
State Senator, 32nd District
GREG TOTTEN
Executive Director, California District
Attorneys Association

Arguments printed on this page are the opinions of the authors and have not been checked for accuracy by any official agency.
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circumstances enumerated in subdivision (a) ofthis seetion has been found to be
true under Section 190.4.
(d) Notwithstanding subdivision (c), every person, not the actual killer, who,
with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission of a
felony enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivisIon (a) ; which felony results in
the death ·of some person or persons, and who is found guilty of mu~der in the first
degree therefor, shall sttft'er be punished by death or confinement imprisonment in
the state prison for life without the possibility of parole , in 1Ill)' cll8e in "hich if a
special circumstance enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) oHhis
section has been found to be true under Section 190.4.

The penalty shall be determined as provided in this section and Sections 190.1,
TOO:£;.190.3, 190.4, and 190.5.
SEC. 3. This act affects !In initiative statute and shall become effective only
when submitted to and approved by the voters pursuant to subdivision (c) of·
Section 10 of Article II of the California Constitution.
SEC. 4. Section 2 of this bill incorporates amendments to Section 190.2 off
Penal Code proposed by both this bill andSB 9. It shall only become operative
(1) both this bill and SB 9 are submitted to and approved by the voters pursuant
to subdivision (c) of Section 10 of Article II of the California Constitution and
become effective on the same date, (2) each bill amends Section 190.2 of the Penal
Code, and (3) this bill receives more affirmative votes from the voters than SB 9,
in which case Section 1 of this bill shall not become operative.

Proposition 196: Text of Proposed Law
This law proposed by Senate Bill 9 (Statutes of 1995, Chapter 478) is submitted
to the people in accordance with the provisions of Article II, Section 10 of the
Constitution.
This proposed law amends a section of the Penal Code; therefore, existing
provisions proposed to be deleted are printed in stIikeout type and new provisions
proposed to be added are printed in italic type to indicate that they are new.

PROPOSED LAW
SECTION 1. Section 190.2 of the Penal Code is amended to read:
190.2. (a) The penalty for a defendant who is found ~ilty of murder in the
first degree shltH-be is death or confinement imprisonment In the state prison for a
term-of-life without the possibility of parole in all)' cIIse in which if one or more of
the following special circumstances has been found under Section 190.4 ; to be
true:
(1) The murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain.
(2) The defendant was ple~iousl, convicted previously of murder in the first
degree or second degree. For the purpose of this paragraph, an offense committed
in another jurisdiction, which if committed in California would be punishable as
first or second degree murder, shall be deemed murder in the first or second
degree.
.
(3) The defendant has been convicted in this proceeding been conneted of more
than one offense cf murder in the first or second degree.
(4) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or
explosive planted, hidden, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or
structure, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that his or
her act or acts would create a great risk of death to a human being or human
beings.
.
(5) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or to perfect, or attempt to perfect, an escape from lawful custody.
(6) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or
explosive that the defendant mailed or delivered, attempted to mail or deliver, or
came caused to be mailed. or delivered, and the defendant knew, or reasonably
should have known, that his or her act or acts would create a great risk of death
to a human being or human beings.
(7) The victim was a peace officer, as defined in Section 830.1, 830.2, 830.3,
830.31,830.32,830.33,830.34,830.35,830.36,830.37, 83D.4, 830.5, 830.6, 830.10,
830.11, or 830.12, who, while engaged in the course of the performance of his or
her duties, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably
should have known, that .the victim was a peace officer engaged in the
performance of his or her duties; or the victim was.a peace officer, as defined in
the abo.e enunlelated above-enumerated sections ofthe Penal Code, or a former
peace officer under any of such those sections, and was intentionally killed in
retaliation for the performance of his or her official duties.
(8) The victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent, who, while
engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally
killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the
victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent -; engaged in the
performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a federal law enforcemint
officer or agent, and was intentionally killed in retaliation for the performance of
his or her official duties.
(9) The victim was a firefighter, <IS defined in Section 245.1, who, while
engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally
killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the
victim was a firefighter engaged in the performance of his or her duties.
(10) The victim was a witness to a crime who was intentionally killed for the
purpose of preventing his or her testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding,
and the killing was not committed during the commission, or attempted
commission, of the crime to which he or she was a witness; or the victim was a
witness to a crime and was intentionally killed in retaliation for his or her
testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding. As used in this paragraph,
"juvenile proceeding" means a proceeding brought pursuant to Section 602 or 707
of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(11) The victim was a prosecutor or assistant prosecutor, or a former prosecutor
or a former assistant prosecutor 01 118sistant pi osecutol , of any local or state
prosecutor's office in this state or any other state, or a of any federal prosecutor's
office, and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to
prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties.
(12) The victim was a judge or former judge of any court of record in the local,
state, or federal system in the State of Calif01 nia, 01 in this or any other state of
the United States, and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation
for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties.
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(13) The victim was an elected or appointed official, or a forme~ elected or
former appointed official, of the federal government, of a local or state
government of Clllifoinill this state, or of any local or state government of any
other state in of the United States, and the kiHing murder was intentionally
carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's
official duties.
(14) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting
exceptional depravity. As utilized in this section, the phrase especilll!, "eseecially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depIII'tt, depravity means
a conscienceless., or pitiless crime which that is unnecessarily torturous to the
victim.
(15) The defendant intentionally killed the victim while lying in wait.
(16) The victim was intentionally killed because of his or her race, color,
religion, nationality, or country of origin.
(17)' The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was
an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate
flight after committing, or attempting to commit, the following felonies:

ffi
(A) Robbery in violation of Section 211 or 212.5.

fiB

.

(B) Kidnapping in violation of Section 207 or 209.
(iii7
(C) Rape in violation of Section 261.

6v1
(D) Sodomy in violation of Section 286.
M
.
(E) The performance of a lewd or lascivious act upon the person of a child und
the age of 14 years in violation of Section 288.

M?

(F) Oral copulation in violation of Section 288a.
fW1
(G) Burglary in the first or second degree in violation of Section 460.

\Tiii1

(H) Arson in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 451.

6x1

(l) Train wrecking in violation of Section 219.
(J) Mayhem in violation of Section 203.

(K) Rape by instrument in violation of Section 289.
(18) The murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture.
(19) The defennant intentionally killed the victim by the administration of
poison.
(20) The murder was intentional and perpetrated by means of discharging a
firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person or persons outside
the vehicle with the'intent to inflict death. For purposes of this paragraph, "motor
vehicle" means any vehicle as defined in Section 415 of the Vehicle Code.

(b) Unless an intent to kill is specifically required under subdivision (a) for a
special circumstance enumerated therein, an actual killer, as to whom such the
special circumstance has been found to be true under Section 190.4, need not
have had any intent to kill at the time of the commission of the offense which is
the basis of the special circumstance in order to Sttffer be punished by death or
confinenlent imprisonment in the state prison for II telm of life without the
possibility of parole.
(c) Every person, not the actual killer, who, with the intent to kill, aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists any actor in the
commission of murder in the first degree shall StHfer be punished by death or
confinement imprisonment in the state prison for a telm of life without the
possibility of parole, in 1Ill)' cIIse in which if one or more of the special
circumstances enumerated in subdivision (a) of this section has been found to be
true under Section 190.4.
(d) Notwithstanding subdivision (c), every person, not the actual killer, who,
with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission of a
felony enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a), which felony results in the
death of some person or persons, and who is found guilty of murder in the first
degree therefor, shall strlfer be punished by death or eonfinement imprisonment ,the state prison for life without the possibility of parole , in an, case in whieh ij
special circumstance enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) of-thto
section has been found to be true under Section 190.4.
The penalty shall be determined as provided in this section and Sections 190.1,
TOO:£; 190.3, 19D.4, and 190.5.
SEC. 2. Section 190.2 of the Penal Code is amended to read:
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190.2. (a) The penalty for a defendant who is found guilty of murder in the
first degree shftH-be is death or confinement imprisonment in the state prison for a
term-of life without the possibility of parole in !In, c!lse in which if one or more of
the following special circumstances has been found under Section 190.4; to be
true:
'(1) The murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain.
,2) The defendant was previonsly convicted previously of murder in the first
ttegree or second degree. For the purpose of this paragraph, an offense committed
in another jurisdiction, which if committed in California would be punishable as
first or second degree murder, shall be deemed murder in the first or second
degree.
(3) The defendant h!ts, in this proceeding, has been convicted of more than
one offense of murder in the first or second degree.
(4) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or
explosive planted, hidden, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or
structure, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that his or
her act or acts would create a great risk of death to !I hnm!ln being one or more
humart beings.
(5) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or to perMct, Ot !lttempt, or perfecting or attempting to perfect, an
escape from lawful custody.
(6) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or
explosive that the defendant mailed or delivered, attempted to mail or deliver, or
Clttlre caused to be mailed or delivered, and the defendant knew, or reasonably
should have known, that his or her act or acts would create a great risk of death
to a hnm!ln being one or more human beings.
(7) The victim was a peace officer, as defined in Section 830.1, 830.2, 830.3,
830.31,830.32,830.33,830.34,830.35,830.36,830.37, 830,4, 830.5, 830.6, 830.10,
830.11, or 830.12, who, while engaged in the course of the performance of his or
her duties, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably
should have known, that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the
performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a peace officer, as defined in
the !tho, e ennmer 3ted above-enumerated sections ofthe Penm Code, or a former
peace officer under any of SttCh those sections, and was intentionally killed in
retaliation for the performance of his or her official duties.
(8) The victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent; who, while
engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally
killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the
victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent; engaged in the
performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a federal law enforcement
officer or agent, and was intentionally killed in retaliation for the performance of
his or her official duties.
(9) The victim was a firefighter, as defined in Section 245.1, who, while
gaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally
Je.d, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the
victim was a firefighter engaged in the performance of his or her duties.
(10) The victim was a witness to a crime who was intentionally killed for the
purpose of preventing his or her testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding,
and the killing was not committed during the commission; or attempted
commission, of the crime to which he or she was a witness; or the victim was a
witness to a crime and was intentionally killed in retaliation for his or her
testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding. As used in this paragraph,
"juvenile proceeding" means a proceeding brought pursuant to Section 602 or 707
of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
.
(11) The victim was a prosecutor or assistant prosecutor or a former prosecutor
or assistant prosecutor of any local or state prosecutor's office in this st!Ite or any
other state, or of a federal prosecutor's office, and the murder was intentionally
carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's
official duties.
(12) The victim was a judge or former judge of any court of record in the local,
state, or federal system in the St3te of C!llifOl ni!l, or in this or any other state of
the United St!ltes, and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation'
for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties.
(13) The victim was an elected or appointed official or former official of the
federal government, or of !I any local or state government of C!llifor ni!l, or of !lHY

loc!llor st3te government ohny other st3te in the United St!ltes this or any other
state, and the killing was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent
the performance of, the victim's official duties.
(14) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting
exceptional depravity. As tttilired used in this section, the phrase especi!lll,
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depr!l' ity
depravity" means a conscienceless ,-or pitiless crime whi:eh that is unnecessarily
torturous to the victim.

(15) The defendant intentionally killed the victim while lying in wait.
(16) The victim was intentionally killed because of his or her race, color,
religion, nationality, or country of origin.
(17) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was
an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate
flight after committing, or attempting to commit, the following felonies:
@
(A) Robbery in violation of Section 211 or 212.5.

Eii1
(B) Kidnapping in violation of Section 207 or, 209, or 209.5 .
\iii}
(C) Rape in violation of Section 261.
(iv)
(D) Sodomy in violation of Section 286.

M
(E) The performance of a lewd or lascivious act upon the person of a child under
the age of 14 years in violation of Section 288.

m1

(F) Oral copulation in violation of Section 288a.
fvit)
(G) Burglary in the first or second degree in violation of Section 460.
fvit)
(H) Arson in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 451.

tix7
(!) Train wrecking in violation of Section 219.
(J) Mayhem in violation of Section 203.

(K) Rape by instrument in violation of Section 289.
(L) Carjacking, as defined in Section 215.
(18) The murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture.
(19) The defendant intentionally killed the victim by the administration of
poison.
(20) The victim was a juror in any court of record in the local, state, or federal
system in this or any other state, and the murder was intentionally carried out in
retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim s official duties.
(21) The murder was intentional and perpetrated by means of discharging a
firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person or persons outside
the vehicle with the intent to inflict death. For purposes of this paragraph, "motor
vehicle" means any vehicle as defined in Section 415 of the Vehicle Code.
(b) Unless an intent to kill is specifically required under subdivision (a) for a
special circumstance enumerated therein, an actual killer, as to whom SttCh the
special circumstance has been found to be true under Section 190.4, need not
have had any intent to kill at the time of the commission of the offense which is
the basis of the special circumstance in order to suffer death or confinement in the
state prison for It'term-of life without the possibility of parole.
(c) Every person, not the actual killer, who, with the intent to kill, aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists any actor in the
commission of murder in the first degree shall sttffeI' be punished by death or
confinement imprisonment in the state prison for a term of life without the
possibility of parole, ill allY case in which if one or more of the special
circumstances enumerated in subdivision (a) of this section has been found to be
true under Section 190.4.
(d) Notwithstanding subdivision (c), every person, not the actual killer, who,
with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission of a
felony enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a); which felony results in
the death of some person or persons, and who is found guilty of murder in the first
degree therefor, shall snft'er be punished by death or confinement imprisonment in
the state prison for life without the possibility of parole , in any case in wmeh if a
special circumstance enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) t!f-tIom
section has been found to be true under Section 190.4.
The penalty shall be determined as provided in this section and Sections 190.1,
tW:£; 190.3, 190.4, and 190.5.
SEC. 3. This act affects an initiative statute, and shall become effective only
when submitted to, and approved by, the voters pursuant to subdivision (e) of
Section 10 of Article II of the California Constitution.
SEC. 4. Section 2 of this bill incorporates amendments to Section 190.2 of the
Penal Code proposed by both this bill and SB 32. It shall only become operative if
(1) both this bill and SB 32 are submitted to and approved by the voters pursuant
to subdivision (c) of Section 10 of Article II of the California Constitution and
become effective on the same date, (2) each bill amends Section 190.2 of the Penal
Code, and (3) this bill receives more affirmative votes from the voters than SB 32,
in which case Section 1 of this bill shall not become operative.

Proposition 197: Text of Proposed Law
This law proposed by Senate Bill 28 (Statutes of 1995, Chapter 779) is
submitted to the people in accordance with the provisions of Article II, Section 10
of the Constitution.
This proposed law amends and adds sections to the Fish and Game Code, and
lends a section of an initiative; therefore, existing provisions proposed to be
~tlleted are printed in str ikeont type and new provisions proposed to be added are
printed in italic type to indicate that they are new.
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PROPOSED LAW
SECTION 1. The Legislature finds and declares, as.follows:
(a) It is appropriate for the Legislature and the Department ofFish and Game
to act prudently to address the needs of our changing society. California's complex
and ever-changing population requires that the department and the Legislature
respond to emergencies and exigencies to safeguard the health and safety of the
people of the state and to balance the needs of the people with the necessity to
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